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I. Introduction 
The Life and Jurisprudence of Justice Scalia 
By: Lauren Brophy 
Although a public figure of prominence, intrigue, and even infamy, Justice Antonio 
Scalia is similar to an "average Joe." While countless scholars, critics, and supporters have spent 
considerable time discussing and dissecting Scalia's opinions and personality, he is not an 
enigma. Conversely, Antonin Scalia is simply a product of his environment. His heritage, 
upbringing, religious beliefs, and education have shaped him not only personally, but also 
professionally. While many choose to separate their personal and professional personas, Justice 
Scalia has melded the two, and his background has greatly influenced his jurisprudence as a 
Supreme Court Justice. Scalia's immigrant background, coupled with his devout Catholicism 
and Jesuit education, can be seen in almost every opinion he drafts. When closely examining 
Scalia's personal history and tenure on the Court, it becomes clear: "Whatever he may represent 
politically, Justice Scalia is also an individual in whom constitutional theory and personal 
identity fuse." 1 This paper will discuss how Justice Scalia's jurisprudence is a direct reflection 
of his upbringing, education, and religious beliefs. 
II. Biography 
A. Early Life 
Scalia's background is best described in two words: Italian Catholic. He is the product of 
the quintessential immigrant experience in the northeast, but with certain deviations that strongly 
influenced the Supreme Court Justice. Antonio Scalia was born on March 11, 1936 at Mercer 
Hospital in Trenton, New Jersey? He was the only child of his parents Salvatore Eugene Scalia 
1 JOAN BISKUPIC, AMERICAN ORIGINAL: THE LIFE AND CONSTITUTION OF SUPREME COURT 210 (Sarah Crichton 
Books) (2009). 
2 Jd. at 11. 
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and Catherine Panaro.3 Scalia's father was only seventeen years old when he came through Ellis 
Island from Sicily in 1920. 4 Salvatore Scalia moved to Trenton, like many other Italian 
immigrants, because he knew other Italians who emigrated there. 5 Salvatore, however, defied 
the traditional Italian ways of speaking only Italian and interacting exclusively with other 
immigrants. 6 He was the gifted son of his family; he learned English quickly and was 
determined to be a college professor. 7 Salvatore received his Bachelors degree at Rutgers 
University, and a Masters from Columbia University.8 He eventually fulfilled his "American 
Dream," earned his Ph.D., and became a professor at Brooklyn College, commuting from 
Trenton to New York City to carry out this goal.9 
Scalia's mother Catherine was also a Trenton-native from Italian decent. 10 Her parents, 
Pasquale and Maria Panaro, came to New York City in 1904 before moving to Trenton. 11 
Catherine was their oldest child and was a teacher. 12 The Panaro family lived in a row home on 
North Broad Street in Trenton, which doubled as a tailor shop, dry cleaner, and saloon. 13 
Antonin's parents married, when Salvatore was 25 and Catherine was 23. 14 Salvatore was 
awarded a fellowship from Columbia and the couple went to the University of Rome and 
Florence where Salvatore studied. 15 It was in Florence that the Justice was conceived in 1935.16 
3 /d. at 6. 
4 /d. at 13. 
5 /d. at 13. 
6 !d. at 13. 
7 !d. at 14. 
8 I d. at 14-15. 
9 I d. at 14-15. 
10 !d. at 11. 
11 /d. at 11. 
12 !d. at 11. 
13 !d. at 11. 
14 !d. at 14. 
15 !d. at 14. 
16 !d. at 14. 
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He would be the couple's only child. 17 After Antonin was born, the Scalia family had a fairly 
transient life. 18 They lived with Salvatore's parents for a year, the Panaro aunts, and then in a 
room apartment up the street. 19 Like many immigrants seeking to assimilate in the United States, 
the family spoke English and Antonin did not speak Italian with his family. In never learning 
Italian, Scalia noted that "It is the shame of my life .. .I regret that I disappointed my father in that 
regard. "20 After moving around in Trenton, even living with a Trenton High School teacher for a 
period, the Scalia family moved to Elmhurst, Queens when Antonin was six years old, in order to 
accommodate Salvatore's commute to teach at Brooklyn College.21 In Queens, Scalia attended 
P.S. 13 in Elmhurst for elementary school, but had weekly "release time" to attend Catholic 
education classes on Wednesday afternoons. 22 The Scalia's home was full of books, which 
fostered intellectualism and placed Scalia at an advantage compared to other immigrants living 
in the neighborhood.23 Moreover, Scalia's parents had extremely high expectations for their 
child's academic performance, and their household was "small and intense."24 If Antonin Scalia 
brought home an "A", his father inquired why he didn't bring home an "A+"?5 All of these 
factors had a great impact on Scalia and shaped him early in life to become both the deeply 
religious and intelligent man that he is today. 
17 /d. at 14. 
18 /d. at 14. 
19 !d. at 14. 
B. The Tension Between the Scalias and the Panaros 
20 Jd. at 19 (quoting Author Interview with Antonin Scalia, June 28, 2008). 
21 /d. at 15, 19. 
22 /d. at 19. 
23 /d. at 18. 
24 /d. at 20. 
25 !d. at 20. 
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The boisterous, yet rules-oriented Justice is the product of a similarly juxtaposed family 
dynamic. The biographer of Scalia noted that, "Scalia's father was as restrained as the Panaro's 
were energetic. As the Panaros socialized around town, Scalia's father had his head in a book."26 
His mother's family was the "restless Panaro side."27 From that clan, Justice Scalia "picked up a 
knack for levity and the good timing of a storyteller, along with a sense of showmanship and the 
gestures of comical exaggeration. He also found his first legal and political model in Vince, a 
lawyer uncle."28 Scalia's father was "scholarly [and] taught Antonin to value the words of a text 
and appreciate cast-iron rules akin to those found in Dante's orderly universe of sin and 
suffering. His father's diligence and strict code of integrity impressed the boy. "29 
The tension between these two sides of the family created a tension within the Justice. 
Antonin Scalia's Aunt described the teenaged-boy as "bull-headed .. . When he wanted to do 
something, and his parents [did not want him to do it], you had to give him a very, very good 
argwnent about why he could not do it. .. You couldn't say to him, 'Because I said so.' We call it 
in Italian a capo tosta. He had a hard head. You couldn't dissuade him. He knew what he 
wanted--even when he was little. "30 This tension can even be seen today as the Justice asks 
tough questions on the bench, but does so with a unique sense of hwnor and jovial nature. 
26 Id. at 13. 
27 ld at 17. 
28 ld 
29 ld 
C. High School and College 
30 Jd at 20 (quoting Author Interview with Lenora Panaro, September 11, 2008). 
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Scalia failed the entrance exam to attend Regis High School, a Jesuit school on the Upper 
East Side.31 Instead, he received a full scholarship to Xavier High School on 16th Street in 
Lower Manhattan, which was also an all-boys Jesuit-run schoo1.32 Xavier also had a mandatory 
ROTC program for all students, and each class began with a prayer.33 He was considered an 
"exemplary Catholic" and even thought of becoming a priest. 34 He was partially dissuaded from 
a religious life because he was an only child and wanted to carry-on the family name. 35 Scalia 
also said, "I did not hear the call. "36 
Scalia graduated first in his class at Xavier. 37 He was rejected from his first choice 
college, Princeton University. Scalia later stated that, "I was an Italian boy from Queens, not 
quite the Princeton type."38 He went to his second choice, another Jesuit institution, Georgetown 
University. 39 Georgetown reinforced Scalia's Catholic beliefs and conservatism. He also 
traveled abroad, like his father, to Switzerland and Italy.40 He graduated first in his class. In his 
valedictorian speech, Scalia told his classmates that they are "leaders of real, a true, a Catholic 
intellectualism. ,,4l An event of particular importance that truly shaped Scalia occurred during his 
final set of exams at Georgetown. Scalia was asked what he believed was the most significant 
event in history.42 After racking his brain for an appropriate answer, he answered that it was the 
Battle of Waterloo.43 His professor sharply disagreed, and declared that the most important 
31 I d. at 20. 
32 Jd. at 21. 
33 Jd. 
34 I d. at 22. 
35 Jd. 
36 ld. 
37 Jd. at 23. 
38 Jd. 
39 ld. 
40 ld. at 25. 
41 Jd. 
42 Jd. 
43 ld. 
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event in history was the Incarnation. 44 Scalia reflected that, "It was the last lesson I learned at 
Georgetown: not to separate your religious life from your intellectual life. They're not 
separate."45 As seen in Scalia's jurisprudence, this notion has remained with the Justice. 
D. Law School 
Scalia was accepted to Harvard Law.46 He joined the St. Thomas More Society of fellow 
Catholic law students.47 He was also a member of the Law Review.48 While at Harvard, Scalia 
met his wife, Maureen McCarthy, who was also Catholic.49 She was studying at Radcliffe and 
the two immediately hit it off on a blind date. 50 Scalia summered at Foley and Lardner in 
Milwaukee after his second year. 51 He was ultimately convinced, however, to join Jones Day in 
Cleveland upon graduation. 52 He graduated Magna Cum Laude. 53 
E. Legal Career 
Scalia remained at Jones Day for six years, 54 but left this prestigious firm job just as he 
was being considered for partner. 55 When asked why he left the firm at this important watershed 
in his career, Scalia retorted, "Because I was about to become partner!" 56 Although some 
speculated that Scalia left his position at Jones Day because he would not make partner, these 
rumors have been dispelled. 57 Partners at Jones Day insisted that Scalia "was very highly 
44 !d. 
45 !d. (quoting Author Interview with Antonin Scalia, January 28, 2008). 
46 !d. at 26. 
47 !d. at 27. 
48 !d. at 28. 
49 !d. at 30. 
50 !d. 
51 !d. at 29. 
52 !d. at 30. 
53 I d. at 28. 
54 !d. at 37. 
55 !d. at 34. 
56 !d. at 37. 
57 !d. at 38. 
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regarded ... [H]e deliberately made the choice himself to move to teaching."58 Scalia had set a 
goal of being a professor, like his father. 59 He was tom between teaching positions at Cornell 
University and the University of Virginia, but ultimately chose the latter-much to the dismay of 
his wife Maureen, who had already purchased winter coats for their growing family. 60 After 
only four years of teaching at the University of Virginia, Scalia once again changed jobs, this 
time moving to Washington, DC to be the general counsel of the Office of Telecommunications 
Policy. 61 After only one year in this position, from 1971-1972, Scalia transitioned to a role as 
Chairman of the U.S. Administrative Conference, from 1972-1974.62 Scalia's government work 
was amidst the Watergate scandal, and although he believed he would only stay in government 
for a couple of years, 63 "the thrill of the executive branch, even in the turbulence of Watergate, 
seized Scalia." 64 As vacancies grew following the scandal, Nixon advisors were seeking 
someone to assume the role of Assistant Attorney General. 65 
Scalia proved to be the perfect candidate for the Assistant Attorney General position. Jon 
Rose, who spearheaded the search, was seeking someone "who could command the respect of 
staff lawyers" and who could "handle the stress" amidst Watergate. 66 Scalia's first introductions 
with Nixon aides went very well, and they noted that they liked Scalia immediately, because of 
his "intellectual ability, his sense of humor, [and] his family story."67 As Scalia was pending 
confirmation for this job, turbulence in Washington erupted. The Supreme Court unanimously 
58 I d. (quoting transcript of witnesses before the Senate Judiciary Committee hearing on Antonin Scalia's 
nomination for Supreme Court, August 6, 1986). 
59 !d. at 37. 
60 !d. 
61 !d. at 38. 
62 The New York Times, Times Topics Fact Box, 
http:/ /topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/people/s/antonin _ scalia/ (last visited Dec. 1, 20 13). 
63 Biskupic, supra note 1, at 38. 
64 !d. 
65 !d. 
66 !d. 
67 Jd. (quoting interview with Jonathan Rose, February 8, 2007). 
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ruled that President Nixon had to turn over the Oval Office tapes, and the House Judiciary 
Committee passed its first article of impeachment, which charged Nixon obstruction of justice 
for his attempt to cover up the Watergate burglary. 68 The Watergate investigation uncovered 
incriminating transcripts ofNixon ordering a stop to the investigation of the Watergate burglary, 
and Nixon shortly thereafter announced his resignation. 69 Ford ultimately assumed the 
Presidency, and he continued with Scalia's nomination to the Office of Legal Counsel as the 
Assistant Attorney General.70 The Senate confirmed Scalia on August 22, 1974.71 Scalia's first 
assignment in this role was to write an opinion determining whether Nixon owned the tapes and 
documents the special prosecutor was seeking. 72 Scalia wrote, "By custom and tradition, the 
files of the White House Office belong to the President in whose Administration they are 
accumulated. It has been the invariable practice, at the end of an Administration, for the 
outgoing President or his estate to authorize the depository or deposition to be made of such 
files." 73 Even in his first opinion, before he assumed the bench, Scalia emphasized custom, 
tradition, and the deferential guard of executive power. Scalia remained in this position in the 
Office of Legal Counsel until 1977, when he returned to academia to teach at the University of 
Chicago after being passed over as replacement for Justice Douglas on the Supreme Court, who 
was instead replaced by Justice Stevens.74 
F. The University of Chicago and The Federalist Society 
Scalia's supervisor at the Office of Legal Counsel suggested that he teach at the 
University of Chicago. Although Scalia very much enjoyed "[mixing] it up with students and 
68 !d. at 39-40. 
69 !d. at 40. 
70 !d. 
71 /d. 
72 !d. at 42. 
73 !d. (quoting a first draft of his opinion distributed to Assistant Attorney General Carla Hills on September 3, 
1974). 
74 I d. at 60-61. 
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[getting] arguments going[,]"75 he was annoyed that "too many students ... had turned to law 'to 
save the world. "'76 He noted that, "[t]here are far better ways to save the world ... than become a 
lawyer."77 Scalia was also "a relatively lonely voice of defiant conservatism."78 However, he 
found company amongst two law students, Lee Liberman and David Mcintosh, who wanted to 
create conservative debate forums at the University of Chicago.79 They found themselves in the 
minority at law school, with most student organizations falling on the left. 80 In the wake of 
Reagan's election to the Presidency, the students wanted to create a forum for other like-minded 
conservatives-both on the campus at the University of Chicago, and beyond. They named their 
organization the Federalist Society, named after the Federalist papers written by Alexander 
Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay. 81 As an ideologically aligned partner in the 
conservative movement, Scalia served as the faculty advisor for the Federalist Society, and the 
group "offered an environment for a range of conservatives and libertarians, drawing in those 
opposed to abortion and busing, along with free-market thinkers who were uninterested in a 
social policy agenda."82 Neither Scalia nor its student founders could have predicted that the 
Federalist Society would popularize and give momentum to conservative thinking and the 
originalist interpretation of the Constitution. Scalia noted that, "We thought we were just plating 
a flower among the weeds of academic liberalism. It turned out to be an oak."83 
During his tenure at the University of Chicago, Scalia was presented a number of 
professional opportunities with the federal government. Following Reagan's election to the 
75 !d. at 66 (quoting an Author Interview with Antonin Scalia, May 1, 2008). 
76 !d. 
77 !d. 
78 !d. at 71. 
79 !d. at 75. 
80 !d. 
81 !d. at 76. 
82 !d. at 78. 
83 !d. at 79. 
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Presidency, Scalia had his eye on the position of solicitor general in the administration. 84 In 
early 1981, Scalia was on the short list for the position, and he flew to Washington, DC to meet 
with the Attorney General, who would make the final choice. 85 Despite his desire to leave 
Chicago and obtain this coveted position, Scalia was rejected. 86 Decades later, Scalia admitted, 
"I was bitterly disappointed .. .I never forgot it."87 In the spring of 1982, after Scalia lost the 
solicitor general position, he was offered a seat on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh 
Circuit in Chicago, which he declined. 88 Scalia was both holding out for a position on the 
federal appeals court for the District of Columbia Circuit and was eager to leave Chicago. 89 
Simply put, "The University of Chicago's Hype Park neighborhood was not a good match for the 
Scalias. They thought their children's school not academically rigorous enough. They found 
their neighborhood Catholic parish too liberal and drove into downtown Chicago in search of a 
more conservative place to worship. Born, reared, and educated on the East Coast, they were not 
happy in Chicago."90 Scalia's wait paid off, and in 1982 President Reagan offered him a position 
on the D.C. Circuit.91 
G. The D.C. Circuit Years 
Scalia's time on the D.C. Circuit laid the groundwork for his demeanor, habits, and 
jurisprudence on the Supreme Court. He was only forty-six years old when he joined the D.C. 
Circuit in 1982, 92 but he unabashedly conflicted with judges who were older and more 
84 ld at 73 . 
85 Jd at 73-74. 
86 ld at 74. 
87 ld 
88 Jd. at 80. 
89 Jd. 
90 ld at 73. 
91 ld at 80. 
92 ld at 88. 
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experienced.93 However, even when he departed substantively on the law and his approach to 
Constitutional interpretation, he was nonetheless well-liked.94 Justice Ginsberg sat on the D.C. 
Circuit at the same time as Scalia, and noted that, "He made himself the centerpiece. He was 
very jovial, thinking himself very clever and full of himself. But nothing that was obnoxious. It 
was quite pleasant."95 Later, the two would become close friends, celebrating New Years Eve 
annually and taking family vacations together.96 Despite their ideological differences, Ginsburg 
admitted she was "fascinated by him because he was so intelligent and so amusing ... You could 
still resist his position, but you still had to like him. "97 
This sentiment was felt by most, as Scalia was fairly easygoing with his clerks and used 
them as sounding boards for his decisions.98 Given Scalia's lively opinions and love for the text, 
instilled by his father, he devoted much time to drafting his opinions and he had an "interest in 
getting the words just right."99 Scalia said in an interview that, "I like the intellectual endeavor. I 
like playing with ideas and words and analyzing the meaning of statutes."100 Some of the other 
judge's clerks, however, were frustrated by Scalia's approach, and dubbed him "the Ninopath," 
because of his unwillingness to bend in his drafting process. 101 Scalia's own clerk, former 
student and Federalist Society founder Lee Silberman, stated that he was "tireless in chasing 
down and eliminating bad dicta from his colleagues' opinions"102 and eliminating any phrases or 
words that "could potentially broaden the reach of a ruling."103 
93 !d. 
94 ld 
95 Id 
96 ld at 89. 
97 Id 
98 ld 
99 Id 
1oo Id 
101 ld at 90. 
102 !d. at 91. 
1o3 Id 
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In terms of substantive law, Scalia practiced what he preached as a professor, faculty 
advisor to a conservative student group, and former Justice Department and Executive Branch 
employee. He read individual rights narrowly and protested race-based and sex-based policies 
and practices to compensate for past discrimination. 104 Scalia also made it clear that he wanted 
judges to "engage in less judicial review of federal regulators' actions." 105 He wanted to create 
additional hurdles for consumer and special interest groups to bring their grievances to court, and 
he wanted judges to shift their method of statutory interpretation by focusing only on the text and 
not the legislative history of committee reports. 106 Some critics accused Scalia of catering his 
opinions in a "conscious effort to appeal to President Reagan's far-right aides" in anticipation of 
gaining a Supreme Court nomination.107 Scalia remained on the D.C. Circuit for four years, 
from 1982-1986, when he would be elevated to the country's highest court. 
H. Supreme Court Appointment and Confirmation 
Scalia had some notable advantages helping him in his appointment to the Supreme 
Court, which ultimately led to an easy approval and unanimous confirmation by the Senate. 108 In 
his confirmation hearing, Scalia was supported by his entire family, including his nine children 
and wife Maureen. 109 He had image of wholesomeness and family loyalty working in his favor 
throughout his confirmation. 110 Additionally, the highly contentious confirmation of Justice 
Rehnquist just a week prior to Scalia's hearing was viewed as, at least in part, the reason the 
confirmation committee took it easy on Scalia. 111 Additionally, insiders in Washington strongly 
supported Scalia, with Patrick Buchanan noting, "I would lean to Scalia for the first seat [of 
104 !d. 
105 !d. 
106 !d. 
107 !d. at 96. 
108 !d. at 121. 
109 !d. at 99. 
110 !d. at 99-100. 
111 Jd. at 100. 
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Reagan's second term]. He is an Italian-American, a Roman Catholic, who would be the first 
Italian ever nominated-a tremendous achievement for what is America's largest ethnic 
minority, not yet fully assimilated into the melting pot-a minority which provides the GOP its 
crucial margins of victory in New Jersey, Connecticut, and New York." 112 Even then-
Democratic Senator Joseph Biden proclaimed that, "There is a significant distinction between 
this nominee [and Rehnquist.] One is that this nominee has demonstrated through his career that 
he has an intellectual flexibility. He is not a rigid man."113 Of course, Biden later stated that, 
"The vote I most regret casting out of all the ones I ever cast was voting for [Scalia.]" 114 
Ultimately, on September 17, Constitution Day, the Senate unanimously confirmed Scalia, by 
98-0. 115 It is fairly safe to say that this breezy confirmation process was not an omen of the 
support Scalia would receive on the Supreme Court, where he often "argu[ ed] in vain" against 
other justices in reaching decisions. 116 Paradoxically, one of the most controversial Supreme 
Court Justices did not face such controversy in his confirmation to this role. 
III. Jurisprudential Approach 
Scalia's jurisprudence is highly influenced by his education and background. This is 
particularly true given that there is no explicit directive within the Constitution that "mandates 
that the Supreme Court don a historical straightjacket" and read the Constitution in light of its 
original meaning and text. 117 Scalia's approach to constitutional interpretation, which emphasizes 
its original meaning and plain text, therefore must be found outside the Constitution. 118 Given 
112 !d. at 106. 
113 !d. at 121. 
114 !d. 
115 !d. 
116 !d. at 132. 
117 David M. Zlotnick, Justice Scalia and His Critics: An Exploration of Scalia 's Fidelity to His Constitutional 
Methodology, 42 EMORY L.J. 1377, 1382 (1999) (citing Cass Sunstein, Justice Scalia 's Democratic Formalism, 107 
YALE L.J. 529,562 (1997)). 
118 !d. at 1383 
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that as early as high school, Scalia had established his academic prowess, his high regard and 
respect for his Catholic faith, and his rule-oriented nature, it is likely that Scalia's jurisprudence 
was influenced by his upbringing and education. 119 
Scalia is self-proclaimed as having an "original meaning", rather than an "original 
intent", approach to constitutional interpretation. 120 This means that he seeks to determine the 
original meaning of the text, not the draftsmen's intensions behind the text. 121 According to 
Scalia, the "Constitution should be interpreted in terms of the original understanding of its 
framers." 122 Scalia has also stated that "Judges should be restricted to the text in front of them .. 
. According to my judicial philosophy, I feel bound not by what I think the tradition is, but by 
what the text and tradition say. The Constitution is an anchor. I don't need it to create change. 
It's a rock to hold onto. "123 Scalia explains that when the plain meaning of text is not clear or 
dispositive, he can turn to the original meaning or understanding of the Constitution because it 
"establishes a historical criterion that is conceptually quite separate from the preferences of the 
judge himself."124 Scalia adheres to this approach to ensure that judges are not inserting their 
personal beliefs into constitutional interpretation. 125 Scalia fears that "judicial abuse of 
discretion poses a grave danger to our democratic institutions and to the primacy of the written 
Constitution. "126 
119 Biskupic, supra note 1, at 21. 
120 !d. at 118. 
121 Erwin Chemerinsky, The Jurisprudence of Justice Scalia: A Critical Appraisal, 22 U. HAW. L. REV. 385, 390 
(2000). 
122 !d. (citing Antonin Scalia, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW, 38 (1997). 
123 Michael J. Gerhardt, A Tale of Two Textualists: A Critical Comparison of Justices Black and Scalia, 74 B.U. L. 
REv. 25, 30 (1994) (quoting Dan Izenberg, Clinging to the Constitution, JERUSALEM POST, Feb. 19, 1990). 
124 !d. at 30-31. 
125 Julie K. Collins, Scalia 's Raich Concurrence: A Significant Departure from Originalist Interpretation?, MARQ. 
L.REv. 1043, 1051 (2007) (citing Antonin Scalia, Constitutional Interpretation the Old Fashioned Way, Remarks at 
the Woodrow Wilson International Centers for Scholars (Mar. 14 2005), available at 
www .cfif.org/htdocs/legal_issues _updates/us_ supreme_ court/scalia-constitutional-speech.htm). 
126 Gerhardt, supra note 123, at 28. 
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In order to carry out this philosophy, Scalia approaches cases by first examining "the text 
of the document and what it meant to the society that adopted it."127 When determining the 
meaning of various laws and statutes, Scalia believes that "judges should look solely at the text 
of a law and related statutes, rather than at the artifacts of the legislative process."128 Scalia has 
even been known to utilize the dictionary that was published at the time when a statute was 
enacted in order to determine its meaning. 129 He is dismissive of "congressional reports that 
accompan[y] a bill to the floor as merely the work of staff and not representative of a sense of 
Congress." 130 In practicing originalism, Scalia still honors the concept of stare decisis. 131 
However, when precedent conflicts with the plain meaning or original understanding of the 
constitution, precedent is not "law of the same order as the primary sources of constitutional 
interpretation." 132 When Scalia believes that precedent has been wrongly decided or reasoned in 
error, he favors overruling it. 133 However, Scalia has strong convictions regarding separation of 
powers, and he does not believe judges should freely overturn the acts of the legislature. 134 He 
believes that allowing unelected judges to overturn the legislative acts of an elected majority is 
"fundamentally inconsistent with democracy." 135 However, "Scalia has applied varying 
standards for when judges should defer to a legislature."136 While he believes that judges should 
127 Biskurpic, supra note 1, at 118. 
128 !d. at 93. 
129 Collins, supra note 125, at 1051 (quoting Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S 509, 559 (2009) (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(citing the defmition of "enforce" as found in two separate dictionaries published in 1860, the time at which the 
Fourteenth Amendment was adopted). 
130 Biskurpic, supra note 1, at 93. 
131 Collins, supra note 125, at 1051 (citing Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 861 (1989) 
(["[A]lmost every originalist would adulterate [originalism] with .. . stare decisis."). 
132 Gerhardt, supra note 123, at 32 (citing Robert A. Burt, Precedent and Authority in Antonin Scalia's 
Jurisprudence, 12 CARDOZO L. REV. 1685, 1689 (1991)). 
133 ld at 33. 
134 Zlotnick, supra note 117, at 1383-84. 
135 ld at 1383. 
136 Biskurpic, supra note 1 at 355. 
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defer to legislatures regarding the death penalty, gay rights, and abortion, he has not accepted 
deference regarding gun rights and affirmative action. 137 
Scalia's methodology tends to yield bright line tests, which are easy to apply. 138 The 
desire for these rules likely stems from Scalia's education at a military high school, which was 
highly structured and rigid. 139 Scalia seeks these tests because it keeps judges restrained and 
from inserting their personal views into decisions. He believes that broad tests have two positive 
results: (1) it constrains judges by limiting their discretion; and (2) it enables the courts to 
achieve predictability in their decisions, which he asserts is "an essential requirement of justice 
and actually enhances protection of individual rights by providing 'a solid shield of a firm, clear 
principle[.] '"140 
Many have criticized Justice Scalia for departing from this approach when it will not 
allow him to achieve conservative goals. 141 Some find it dubious that "the original meaning of 
the Constitution and the Republican platform are remarkably similar." 142 Although Scalia 
cautions that originalism is not perfect, he claims that, "whatever our problems are, they pale 
next to the problems of the idea of the 'Living Constitution. "'143 
It is also important to note that although not a jurisprudential approach per se, the 
straightforward and even sarcastic tone of his opinions has become one of Scalia's most famous 
contributions on the bench. Even Scalia's critics acknowledge that, "he has a great flair for 
137 !d. 
138 Gerhardt, supra note 123 at 34. 
139 Biskurpic, supra note 1 at 21. 
140 Gerhardt, supra note 123, at 35 (citing Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 
1175, 1185 (1989). 
141 Biskurpic, supra note 1 at 9. 
142 Chemerinsky, supra note 121, at 392. 
143 s· kurp. 1 7 Is IC, supra note at . 
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language and does not mince words when he disagrees with a position" and that his opinion are 
"among the most entertaining to read."144 
Many of Scalia's decisions are in conformity with his conservative ideals, particularly 
First Amendment cases. However, Scalia does adhere to his originalist approach, even when it 
yields more liberal results. The sections below will discuss his jurisprudential style in the 
context of different areas of Constitutional law and how Scalia conforms-or in some cases, 
departs-from his proclaimed jurisprudential styles. When departing from his stated 
jurisprudential approach, it is clear that Scalia's background and religious beliefs are driving his 
decisions. 
IV. Cases Supporting Scalia's Jurisprudential Style 
This section will discuss the main areas in which Scalia adheres to his proclaimed 
jurisprudential approach: the Fourth Amendment, the First Amendment's Establishment Clause, 
statutory interpretation, and judicial restraint from disturbing legislative acts. Scalia's Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence in his majority opinions in Kyllo and Jardines demonstrates his 
loyalty to the plain text of the Fourth Amendment. Scalia's dissent in Lee v. Weisman shows his 
narrow interpretation of the First Amendment and his desire to lower the wall between church 
and state and make clear, easy-to-apply rules. Meanwhile, his dissent in Edwards v. Aguillard is 
emblematic of his proclaimed approach to statutory interpretation by ignoring legislative history 
and instead giving deference to the political process. Lastly, Scalia's dissent in US. v. Windsor 
shows his adherence to judicial restraint and deferring to the legislative process. 
A. Fourth Amendment Cases: Unusual Company 
Scalia's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence is consistent with his "originalist" approach, 
but it often leaves him in usual company on the Court, deciding cases in this area with more 
144 Chemerinsky, supra note 121, at 398. 
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liberal Justices. Because the Fourth Amendment gives explicit protection of"people to be secure 
in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures[,]"145 
Scalia gives great deference to the sanctity of the home and the right of individuals to "retreat 
into his home and there be free unreasonable governmental intrusion." 146 This deference 
typically results in greater protection of criminal defendants, which runs afoul of Scalia's 
conservative ideals. Despite this, Scalia remains faithful to the original text of the Fourth 
Amendment in his jurisprudence in this area of constitutional law. 
Scalia's majority opinion in the recent case of Florida v. Jardines 147 demonstrates his 
commitment to the original meaning and plain text of the Constitution. In Jardines, the Miami-
Dade Police Department acted on an anonymous tip indicating that marijuana was being grown 
in the home of Joelis Jardines. 148 One month after receiving the tip, officers brought a narcotics-
sniffing canine to investigate the home. 149 The officers could not see inside the home because 
the blinds were drawn, so they brought the dog onto the porch to see if the dog would alert to the 
presence of narcotics. 150 Ultimately, the dog gave a positive alert, and the Detective obtained a 
warrant based on the dog's response. 151 The search pursuant to the warrant uncovered the 
presence of marijuana plants, which Jardines sought to suppress at trial, claiming that the use of a 
canine on his porch was an unreasonable search under the Fourth Amendment. 152 The trial court 
granted Jardines' motion to suppress, but the Florida Third District Court of Appeal reversed. 153 
The Florida Supreme Court affmned the trial court's decision to suppress the marijuana plants, 
145 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
146 Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 176 (1984). 
147 133 S.Ct. 1409 (2013). 
148 !d. at 1413 
149 !d. 
150 !d. 
151 !d. 
152 !d. 
153 !d. 
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holding that "the use of the trained narcotic dog to investigate Jardines' home was a Fourth 
Amendment search unsupported by probable cause, rendering invalid the warrant based upon 
information gathered in that search."154 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine the 
limited issue of whether bringing a narcotics dog on to a porch constituted a search under the 
Fourth Amendment. 155 
In his majority opinion, Scalia emphasizes the plain text of the Fourth Amendment, 
noting that "[t]he Fourth Amendment 'indicates with some precision the places and things 
encompassed by its protections': persons, houses, papers, and effects." 156 He further notes that 
investigations conducted within "open fields" are permitted because "such fields are not 
enumerated in the Amendment's text." 157 Rather than analyzing the decision under the 
reasonable expectation of privacy standard under Katz, 158 Scalia rests his decision on the 
standard articulated in Jones159 and the plain text of the Fourth Amendment: because the officers 
obtained information by physically intruding into a protected area of the house-namely, the 
curtilage-their search is rendered unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. 160 Justices 
Thomas, Kagan, Ginsburg, and Sotomayor concurred in the judgment, with Justice Kagan filing 
a separate concurring opinion, in which Ginsburg and Sotomayor joined. 161 Chief Justice 
Roberts and Justices Alito, Kennedy, and Breyer, Scalia's typically conservative colleagues, 
154 !d. 
155 !d. at 1414. 
156 !d. (quoting Oliver supra note 144, at 176). 
157 !d. (citing Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57 (1924)). 
158 In Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), the Court extended Fourth Amendment protection when an 
individual's "reasonable expectation of privacy" is violated, even if there is no physical intrusion of a 
constitutionally protected area. The Court has made clear that "Katz ... add[s] to the baseline, [but] it does not 
subtract anything from the [Fourth] Amendment's protections when the Government does engage in [a] physical 
intrusion of a constitutionally protected area." Jardines, supra note 145, at 1414 (internal quotation omitted). 
159 United States v. Jones, 132 S.Ct. 945 (2012) (holding that when "the Government obtains information by 
physically intruding [on persons, houses, papers, or effects], a search within the original meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment has undoubtedly occurred."). 
160 Jardines, supra note 145, at 1414. 
161 The concurring opinion notes that the concurring Justices would have reached the same result even if they 
decided the case under the Katz reasonable expectation of privacy standard. See id. 
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dissented. 162 Jardines demonstrates that Scalia will remain faithful to the original meaning and 
text of the Constitution, even if he finds himself in unusual company in the decision. This 
decision does not achieve a conservative agenda, and it is emblematic of Scalia's faithfulness to 
his "originalist" jurisprudence. 
Another Fourth Amendment case, Kyllo v. United States/ 63 shows Scalia's commitment 
to Constitutional originalism. Scalia once again wrote for the majority and was joined by 
Justices Souter, Thomas, Ginsburg, and Breyer. 164 Kyllo also involved in-home cultivation of 
marijuana plants, which typically requires high-intensity heat lamps. 165 Agent Elloitt of the 
United States Department of Interior suspected that Danny Kyllo was growing marijuana in his 
home in Florence, Oregon and used an Agema Thermovision 21 0 thermal imaging device to scan 
Kyllo's home for infrared radiation. 166 This radiation cannot be seen with the naked eye, and the 
device "converts radiation into images based on relative warmth[,]" with black indicating cool 
temperatures, white indicating hot, and grey noting relative differences in temperatures. 167 
Scalia notes that in this regard, the thermal device "operates somewhat like a video camera 
showing heat images"168 from within the home. The scan of Kyllo's home showed that certain 
areas were relatively hotter than others, with the roof of the garage emanating the most heat. 169 
Based on this finding, as well as anonymous tips and utility bills, Agent Elliott obtained a 
warrant to search the home, which uncovered the presence of an indoor growing scheme, 
162 The dissent emphasizes that implicit licenses allow visitors to enter a home's curtilage, including the porch, and 
that canine dogs are ubiquitous and have been used in law enforcement for centuries. Jd. at 1420-21. 
163 533 U.S. 27 (2001). 
164 I d. at 29. 
165 ld. 
166 ld 
167 ld at 29-30. 
168 I d. at 30. 
169 Jd. 
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involving more than 100 marijuana plants.17° Kyllo, like Jardines, sought to suppress the plants 
at his trial, which the District Court denied. 171 Although a divided panel for the Ninth Circuit 
originally reversed the trial court's determination, it withdrew its opinion and affirmed the 
District Court, holding that there was no subjective expectation of privacy because Kyllo did not 
attempt to conceal the heat emanating from his home. 172 The Ninth Circuit also found that there 
was no objective expectation of privacy because the thermal imaging device did not expose any 
intimate details of the home. 173 The Supreme Court granted certiorari, and Scalia delivered the 
opinion of the Court, finding that the use of the thermal imaging device constituted an 
unreasonable search under the Fourth Amendment. 174 
Scalia once again gives great deference to the sanctity of the home and the great 
protection afforded to it explicitly by the Fourth Amendment. Scalia notes that "obtaining by 
sense-enhancing technology any information regarding the interior of the home that could not 
otherwise have been obtained without physical 'intrusion into a constitutionally protected area' 
constitutes a search-at least where (as here) the technology in question is not in general public 
use. This assures preservation of that degree of privacy against government that existed when 
the Fourth Amendment was adopted." 175 Although the thermal imaging device was limited to 
obtaining information regarding the heat escaping the house, Scalia insists that "[t]he Fourth 
Amendment's protection of the home has never been tied to measurement of the quality or 
quantity of information obtained." 176 Scalia protects the home from government intrusion 
because the Fourth Amendment explicitly dictates that "all details [from the home] are intimate 
170 ld. 
111 Id. 
172 ld. at 31. 
173 Jd. 
174 Jd. at 34-35. 
175 Id. at 34. 
176 !d. at 37. 
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details, because the entire area is held safe from prying government eyes."177 At the end of his 
opinion, Scalia reverts to the original meaning of the Fourth Amendment when it was enacted. 
He notes that, "we must take the long view, from the original meaning of the Fourth Amendment 
forward." 178 In culminating his opinion, Scalia quotes Carroll v. United States, 179 in a separate 
paragraph, to further emphasize the original interpretation of the Fourth Amendment: "The 
Fourth Amendment is to be construed in the light of what was deemed an unreasonable search 
and seizure when it was adopted, and in a manner which will conserve public interests as well as 
the interests and rights of individual citizens."180 
These Fourth Amendment decisions cut against arguments that Scalia will abandon his 
jurisprudential style in order to achieve conservative ideals. In these decisions, Scalia's opinions 
are joined by more liberal justices, who seek to protect the individual rights of criminal 
defendants. Scalia, however, is unwavering in his originalist approach, and focuses on the 
Fourth Amendment's explicit protection of the home from unreasonable government searches. 
B. First Amendment Jurisprudence: Originalism Favors Lowering the Wall 
Between Church and State 
It is undisputed that Justice Scalia is a devout Catholic and that his faith plays and 
important part in his professional life. He believes that the wall between church and state should 
be lowered in order to "allow greater support for religion." 181 In fact, "when it [comes] down to 
it, he believe[ s] almost no government action would violate the Establishment Clause, short of 
outright coercing religious participation."182 Accordingly, Scalia very narrowly interprets both 
the Establishment Clause and Free Exercise Clause, and "leaves little room for judicial 
177 /d. 
178 ld at 40. 
179 267 U.S. 132, 149 (1925). 
18
° Kyllo, supra note 161, at 40. 
181 Biskurpic, supra note 1, at 139. 
182 ld 
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protection under either." 183 This belief, according to Scalia, is supported by the plain text of the 
Establishment Clause, which states that, "Congress shall make not law respecting the 
establishment of religion." 184 It seems that Scalia takes these words quite literally, and that 
"little will ever violate the Establishment Clause."185 One of Scalia's critics noted that under 
Scalia's approach, the Establishment Clause would only be violated "by the government creating 
its own church, or by force of law requiring religious practices, or by favoring some religions 
over others."186 This arguably ignores the importance in preventing the "government from using 
its power to influence and advance religion or a particular religion."187 However, Scalia remains 
faithful to his jurisprudence in interpreting the First Amendment. Scalia's adherence to the text, 
coupled with his deference to history, led to his fervent dissent in Lee v. Weisman, 188 in which he 
lambasted the majority for their holding that having a clerical member offering a prayer as part 
of a public school's graduation runs afoul of the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment. 189 
In Lee v. Weisman, Daniel Weisman objected to the use of ceremonial prayer at his 
daughter's public school graduation in Providence, Rhode Island! 90 The principal of the school, 
Robert E. Lee, invited a rabbi to deliver prayers at the graduation, in conformity with the custom 
of Providence public schools. 191 Prior to the graduation ceremony, Principal Lee provided the 
rabbi with a pamphlet entitled "Guidelines for Civic Occasions," which emphasized the 
importance of nonsectarian services being both inclusive and sensitive to the diversity of 
183 Chemerinsky, supra note 121, at 386. 
184 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
185 Chemerinsky, supra note 121, at 388. 
186 ld at 389. 
187 Jd 
188 505 U.S. 577 (1992). 
189 Jd at 631 
190 ld at 581. 
191Jd 
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religious beliefs of those attending. 192 Despite this, the District Court found held that this use of 
prayer in public school graduations violated the Establishment Clause, and the Court enjoined 
the practice. 193 The District Court applied the Lemon test194 and found that the practice of prayer 
at public school graduations violated the Establishment Clause. 195 On appeal, the First Circuit 
affirmed. 196 The Court granted certiorari and ultimately affirmed. 
The majority opinion was written by Justice Kennedy and joined by Blackmun, Stevens, 
O'Connor, and Souter. 197 Justices Souter and Blackmun filed concurring opinions, and Justices 
O'Connor and Stevens joined Justice Souter's concurrence. 198 Justice Scalia wrote the dissent, 
and was joined by Justices Rehnquist, White, and Thomas. 199 The majority emphasized that it is 
"a cornerstone principle of our Establishment Clause jurisprudence that 'it is no part of the 
business of government to compose official prayers for any group of the American people to 
recite as a party of a religious program carried on by govemment."' 200 The majority also 
emphasized how students may feel pressured to join in the prayer and follow their teachers?01 
This state-sponsored worship was ultimately deemed an unconstitutional violation of the 
Establishment Clause. 
Scalia began his dissent by summanztng his jurisprudence: "the meamng of the 
[Establishment] Clause Is to be determined by reference to historical practices and 
192 Jd. 
193 Jd. at 584. 
194 The Lemon Test was articulated in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1990) and is the test used by the Court in 
cases involving the Establishment Clause. Under the test, to satisfy the Establishment Clause, the governmental 
practice must (1) reflect a clearly secular purpose; (2) have a primary effect that neither advances no inhibits 
religion; and (3) avoid excessive government entanglement with religion. 
195 Lee, supra note 188, at 585. 
196 ld. 
197 ld. at 579. 
198 Jd. 
199 Jd. 
200 Jd. at 588 (quoting Engel v. Vitalie, 370 U.S. 421,425 (1962)). 
201 Jd. at 594 (noting that "in effect, [prayer] required participation in a religious exercise."); see also Biskurpic, 
supra note 1, at 140. 
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understandings. "202 He criticized the majority for failing to reference history in reachin~ its 
decision. 203 Scalia, in Part I of his opinion, undertakes a lengthy historical analysis, focusing on 
how the "history and tradition of our Nation are replete with public ceremonies featuring 
prayers."204 In more scathing terms, Scalia concludes that "there is simply no support for the 
proposition that the officially sponsored nondenominational invocation and benediction read by 
[the] Rabbi ... -with no one legally coerced to recite them-violated the Constitution of the 
United States. To the contrary, they are so characteristically American they could have come 
from the pen of George Washington or Abraham Lincoln himself."205 In Scalia's view, a narrow 
reading of the Establishment Clause coupled with the historical record supports a finding that 
nondenominational prayer at graduation ceremonies does not run afoul of the Establishment 
Clause. 
Scalia also sharply criticizes the majority's finding that the inclusion of prayer in the 
graduation coerces student participation. 206 In accordance with his jurisprudence, Scalia 
essentially mocks the majority for its definition of coercion, which expands the word's meaning 
beyond the dictionary definition. 207 Scalia notes that he sees "no warrant for expanding the 
concept of coercion beyond acts backed by threat of penalty-a brand of coercion that, happily, 
is readily discernible to those of us who have made a career of reading the disciples of 
Blackstone rather than of Freud."208 Scalia's dissent in Lee v. Weisman exemplifies Scalia's 
narrow and consistent interpretation of the First Amendment's Establishment Clause. It also 
202 /d. at 631. 
203 /d. 
204 ld. at 633. 
205 !d. at 641-42. 
206 /d. at 637. 
207 /d. at 642. 
208 /d. 
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demonstrates Scalia's preference for majority rules, deference to the government, and plain, 
dictionary meaning of words.209 
C. Statutory Interpretation: It Means What It Says 
Justice Scalia takes a firm stand in his jurisprudence regarding statutory interpretation: he 
has deep suspicions of examining legislative history, including committee reports and hearings, 
to determine the meaning of the statute.210 Scalia once stated that, "Our task, as I see it, is not to 
enter the minds of the Members of Congress-who need have nothing in mind in order for their 
votes to be both lawful and effective-but rather to give fair and reasonable meaning to the text 
of the United States Code, adopted by various Congresses at various times."211 Scalia's dissent 
in Edwards v. Aguillarcf1 2 reflects this approach in statutory interpretation, as he gives little 
weight to the legislative history and instead focuses his interpretation on the text of the statute at 
ISSUe. 
Edwards v. Aguillard involved Louisiana's "Creationism Act", which forbade the 
teaching of the theory of evolution in public schools, unless it is accompanied by teaching the 
theory of "creation science."213 The Creationism Act did not require the teaching of either theory 
unless one was taught, and parents, teachers, and religious leaders challenged the 
constitutionality of the Act, claiming it violated the Establishment Clause of the First 
Amendment.214 The District Court held that the Act violated the Establishment Clause because 
"there can be no valid secular reason for prohibiting the teaching of evolution, a theory 
historically opposed by some religious denominations." 215 The Court of Appeals affirmed, 
209 Biskurpic, supra note 1, at 140. 
210 !d. at 146. 
211 ld at 146-47. 
212 482 U.S. 578 (1987). 
213 ld 
214 Id 
215 ld at 582. 
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finding that the "Legislature's actual intent was 'to discredit evolution by counterbalancing its 
teaching at every turn with the teaching of creationism, a religious belief."216 The Supreme 
Court granted certiorari and affirmed.217 
Justice Brennan delivered the opinion of the Court, and Justices Marshall, Blackmun, 
Powell and Stevens joined in the opinion.218 Justice Powell delivered a concurring opinion, in 
which Justice O'Connor joined?19 Justices Scalia dissented, and his fellow conservative, Justice 
Rehnquist, joined in his dissent.220 The majority applied the three-part Lemon221 test, but also 
focused substantially on the legislative history surrounding the enactment of the law. Brennan 
noted that "[i]t is clear from the legislative history that the purpose of the legislative sponsor, 
Senator Bill Keith, was to narrow the science curriculum."222 Moreover, Brennan found that 
because Senator Keith noted in the legislative hearings that he preferred "that neither 
[creationism nor evolution] be taught[,]" the proclaimed propose to provide a "comprehensive 
scientific education" was completely undermined by such statements.223 The majority further 
emphasized the legislative history and statements made throughout the hearings. It noted that 
"[t]he legislative history documents that the Act's primary purpose was to change the science 
curriculum of public schools in order to provide a persuasive advantage to a particular religious 
doctrine that rejects the factual basis of evolution in its entirety." 224 The majority also 
determined that the legislation sought to make the science curriculum reflect an "endorsement of 
a religious view that is antagonistic to the theory of evolution" primarily because Senator Keith 
216 Jd 
217 ld 
218 ld at 579. 
219 Jd 
220 ld. 
221 See supra note 194. 
222 Aguillard, supra note 212, at 587. 
223 !d. 
224 Id. at 592. 
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emphasized that "scientific evidence supporting his religious views should be included in the 
public school curriculum to redress the fact that the theory of evolution incidentally coincided 
with what he characterized as religious beliefs antithetical to his own. "225 
Scalia vehemently dissented in the Court's decision and criticized the majority for 
guessing at the meaning of the Act by "impugning the motives of its supporters."226 He asserts 
that, "what the statute means and what it requires are of rather little concern to the Court" and 
that the Court "finds it necessary to consider only the motives of the legislators who supported 
the [Act]." 227 Scalia concluded that "[t]he people of Louisiana, including those who are 
Christian fundamentalists, are quite entitled, as a secular matter, to have whatever scientific 
evidence there may be against evolution presented in their schools[.]"228 While this shows 
adherence to his jurisprudential approach, Scalia's biographer noted that this reference implied 
Scalia's desire that creationism be on "equal footing" with the theory of evolution, which is in 
conformity with his religious beliefs.229 In summary, Scalia's dissent in Aguillard is both aligned 
with his disdain for legislative history in statutory interpretation and with his personal belief that 
that the wall between church and state should be lowered. 
D. Judicial Restraint: Deference to the Legislature & U.S. v. Windsor 
Scalia has strong beliefs regarding the separation of powers and judicial restraint. He 
believes that courts' proper role is only to protect individual rights from government intrusion, 
and that judges should never become entangled in policy disputes.230 Moreover, Scalia believes 
that the "main danger in judicial interpretation of the Constitution. . .is that the judges will 
225 Jd. at 592-93. 
226 ld. at 611. 
227 Jd. at 612. 
228 Biskurpic, supra note 1, at 139. 
229 Jd. 
230 Bradley C. Karkkainen, "Plain Meaning": Justice Scalia's Jurisprudence of Strict Statutory Construction, 17 
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 401, 426 (1994). 
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mistake their own predilections for the law. Avoiding this error is the hardest party of being a 
conscientious judge."231 Scalia's recent opinion in US. v. Windsor232 demonstrates Scalia's fear 
of judicial activism and disturbing legislative action. In Windsor, Edith Windsor challenged 
Section 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), which prohibited her from claiming an estate 
tax exemption when she inherited her same-sex spouse's estate following her death in 2009?33 
Consequently, Windsor paid $363,053 in estate taxes that she would not have been required to 
pay if she were married to an opposite-sex partner.234 Windsor challenged DOMA, arguing that 
it violated equal protection under the Fifth Amendment. 235 While the suit was pending, the 
Attorney General opted not to defend the constitutionality of Section 3 of DOMA, and the 
Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group (BLAG) intervened to defend the legislation. The District 
Court found DOMA unconstitutional, and the Second Circuit affirmed. 236 Justice Kennedy 
wrote for the majority, and Justices Ginsberg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan joined his opinion. 
Justice Roberts filed a dissent, as did Justice Scalia, which was partially joined by Justice 
Thomas. Justice Alito also filed a dissent, joined in part by Justice Thomas. After deciding the 
procedural issues of whether BLAG had the standing to appeal the case, the majority held that 
DQMA was unconstitutional and violated the Fifth Amendment's Equal Protection guarantees. 
Scalia's dissent disagreed with the majority's holding-both on procedural and 
substantive grounds?37 Scalia begins his opinion by noting that the Court has no power to decide 
the case on standing grounds alone, and even if it did, it has no constitutional authority to strike 
231 Gerhardt, supra note 123, at 29. 
232 113 S.Ct. 2675 (2013). 
233 !d. at 2679. 
234 !d. 
235 !d. 
236 !d. 
237 /d. at 2697. 
30 
The Life and Jurisprudence of Justice Scalia 
By: Lauren Brophy 
down a democratically adopted piece of legislation.238 He argues that the Court is "hungry ... to 
tell everyone its view of the legal question at the heart of this case."239 He further points out that 
Windsor won at both the District Court and Federal Appeals level, and that therefore she suffers 
no injury to be remedied by the Court?40 Scalia asserts that it is "jaw-dropping" for the Court to 
assert its "judicial supremacy over the people's Representatives in Congress and Executive."241 
Scalia then outlines his belief of judicial power, arguing that judges should only incidentally 
determine a law's constitutionality when it is necessary to resolve a dispute.242 After explaining 
why the Court does not have power to decide this case, Scalia also sets forth his beliefs regarding 
same-sex marriage. He asserts that the "Constitution neither requires nor forbids our society to 
approve of same-sex marriage, much as it neither requires nor forbids us to approve of no-fault 
divorce, polygamy, or the consumption of alcohol."243 He notes that "to defend traditional 
marriage is not to condemn, demean, or humiliate those who would prefer other 
arrangements[.]"244 He further attacks the majority for "formally declaring anyone opposed to 
same-sex marriage an enemy of human decency" and for making the issue seem "black-and-
white[.]"245 Scalia concludes by noting that "[s]ome will rejoice in today's decision and some 
will despair at it; that is the nature of a controversy that matter so much to so many. But the 
Court has cheated both sides, robbing the winners of an honest victory, and the losers of the 
peace that comes from a fair defeat. We owed both of them better. I dissent."246 
238 !d. at 2697-98. 
239 !d. at 2698. 
240 !d. 
241 !d. 
242 I d. at 2699. 
243 !d. at 2707. 
244 !d. at 2708. 
245 !d. at 2710, 2711. 
246 !d. at 2711. 
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Scalia's opinion is consistent with his jurisprudential approach of exercising judicial 
restraint and refraining from overturning democratic legislation. His opinion also has tones 
similar to his opinion in Lawrence v. Texas, 247 which shows a strong conviction for judicial 
restraint, but also includes tones of sarcasm and anger towards the majority for affording greater 
rights to homosexuals. This anger and vehemence in cases involving extension of rights to 
same-sex individuals seems to have "a way of under-cutting his assertion of a principled 
approach to the law irrespective of what was at stake in the case. "248 It has even been noted that, 
"Cases in which Scalia believes that elite judges or professors are trying to dismantle the moral 
position of 'the people' bring out a particular vituperativeness ... and leave the unavoidable 
impression that he speaking not only for originalism but also for his own selective notion of the 
vox populi. "249 Regardless of whether Scalia's tone undermines his credibility in this area, it is 
clear that he strictly adheres to his jurisprudence and avoids entangling himself and the Court in 
overturning democratically enacted policies-whether he agrees with them or not. 
V. Departing from Originalism-Achieving Conservative Results Without Regard 
for the Text 
This section discusses the areas of law and decisions where Scalia has departed from his 
originalist and textualist approaches. While adherence to stare decisis offers part of the 
explanation of Scalia's departure from his jurisprudential approach, it cannot be ignored that the 
result in each of the decisions discussed below achieve conservative results-namely, reduced 
protection for minority religions and races, upholding long-standing tradition, and strict 
enforcement of drug laws. 
247 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (where Scalia noted that "Today's opinion is the product of a Court, which is the product of 
a law-profession culture, that has largely signed on to the homosexual agenda, by which I mean the agenda 
promoted by some homosexual activities directed at eliminating the moral opprobrium that has traditionally attached 
to homosexual conduct."). 
248 Biskupic, supra note 1, at 227. 
249 /d. 
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A. Free Exercise and Employment Division v. Smith 
In examining Scalia's majority opinion in Employment Division v. Smith,250 it is, at first 
blush, in conformity with Scalia's jurisprudence of reading the First Amendment narrowly and 
lacking accommodation of minority religions. However, in closely examining the holding, it is 
clear that Scalia had to look beyond the plain text of the Free Exercise Clause, and therefore 
departs from his jurisprudence. Smith presented the issue of whether the Free Exercise Clause 
permits Oregon to include the religious use of peyote within its criminal prohibition of the drug, 
and in doing so, can deny unemployment benefits to persons fired from their jobs because of 
religious use of the drug. 251 Scalia wrote the majority opinion, and was joined by Justices 
Rehnquist, White, Stevens, and Kennedy. Justice O'Connor filed a concurrence and in which 
Parts I and II Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun joined. Justice Blackmun filed a dissenting 
opinion, in which Brennan and Marshall joined. The Respondents claimed that Sherbert v. 
Verner set forth the appropriate standard of review in the case: strict scrutiny. 252 However, 
Scalia noted that the Court has "never held that an individuals religious beliefs excuse him from 
compliance with an otherwise valid law prohibiting conduct that the State is free to regulate."253 
In so concluding, Scalia applied rational basis review and determined that Sherbert should be 
confined to the context of employment cases. 
In reaching his decision, Scalia abandons his textualist approach and fails to recognize 
the flaws of leaving decisions of Free Exercise to the political process. The Free Exercise Clause 
quite clearly provides that, "Congress shall make no law ... prohibiting the free exercise [of 
religion.]" It seems to then follow that a law prohibiting Native Americans from ingesting 
250 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
251 Jd at 874. 
252 ld at 876. 
253 ld at 878. 
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peyote as part of their religion would be in violation of the plain text of the First Amendment. 
However, Scalia seems to impute a word into the Fourth Amendment's text: Congress shall 
make no law intentionally prohibiting the free exercise of religion. This approach clearly 
contradicts his originalist approach by looking beyond the text and original meaning of the 
Constitution. Moreover, although Scalia typically emphasizes that judges should refrain from 
interrupting a legislature's enactment, and that decisions should be left to lawmakers, not judges, 
this approach in practice may fall short in the context of Free Exercise. Religious minorities are 
unlikely to be adequately represented in the political process, and therefore their interests may be 
ignored completely. Additionally, the First Amendment's Free Exercise Clause originally was 
meant to protect religious minorities from freely exercising their respective religions.254 Scalia 
neglects this original understanding and instead reads the work "intentionally" into the text of the 
First Amendment, thus demonstrating a departure from his originalist jurisprudential approach. 
B. The Commerce Clause and Gonzalez v. Raich 
Before examining Scalia's approach to the Commerce Clause and Necessary and Proper 
Clause in Gonzalez v. Raich, 255 it is important to examine the historical understanding of these 
constitutional provisions. At the time the Constitution was adopted, "the initial conception. . 
.was that the powers of the federal government were to be few and defined."256 Early Supreme 
Court cases in this area conformed to this approach. 257 Therefore, "if Scalia were to adhere to 
the meaning of the Constitution's text when it was written, he would follow this relatively 
254 Douglas W. Kmiec, The Original Understanding of the Free Exercise Clause and Religious Diversity, UMKC L. 
REv. 591 (1991). 
255 545 U.S. 1 (2005). 
256 Collins, supra note 125, at 1062 (citing Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803)). 
257 See id. (noting that "in the early Civil Rights Cases, the government did not defend the passage of a broad law 
that regulated individual actors' conduct under a Commerce Clause theory because Congress' power under this 
Clause had not been contemplated for use in this manner.") 
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narrow interpretation of commerce power."258 It was not until the decision in Gibbons v. Ogden 
that the Commerce Clause was interpreted more broadly, allowing for regulation of water that 
only partially affects intrastate matters. 259 The more modem interpretation of the Commerce 
Clause did not emerge until the Court's decision in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel, Corp. in 
193 7 ?60 This watershed decision established a broad interpretation of interstate commerce, and 
the majority established three categories under which Congress can regulate interstate 
commerce: (1) the channels of interstate commerce; (2) the instrumentalities of interstate 
commerce and persons or things in interstate commerce; and (3) activities that substantially 
affect interstate commerce?61 However, because this interpretation did not emerge until 1937, it 
cannot be said to be the original meaning intended by the Constitution's Framers.262 Therefore, 
if Scalia were to remain faithful to his jurisprudential approach, he would reject this 
interpretation. 
Scalia seems to follow an originalist, and therefore narrow and limited, understanding of 
the Commerce Clause in his decision in United States v. Lopez.263 However, Scalia departs from 
originalism and a narrow interpretation of the Commerce Clause in his Gonzalez v. Raich 
concurrence. Raich involved California's Compassionate Use Act, which authorized limited 
.. .c d" 1 264 manJuana use 10r me 1ca use. The Respondents were California residents who used 
marijuana, prescribed by their physicians, to treat medical conditions.265 The Drug Enforcement 
258 I d. at 1062-63. 
259 !d. at 1062. 
260 !d. 
261 Raich, supra note 253, at 33-34 (citing US. v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); US. v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 
(1995); Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Assn., Inc., 452 U.S. 264 (1981). 
262 Collins, supra note 125, at 1062. 
263 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (in which Scalia joined Rehnquist's opinion, holding that the Gun-Free Schools Act violates 
Congress' commerce clause powers because the presence of guns in schools zones does not have a substantial 
impact on interstate commerce). 
264 Raich, supra note 255, at 1. 
265 !d. 
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Agency (DEA) seized the Respondent's marijuana plants, and they challenged the Controlled 
Substances Act (CSA) as an unconstitutional violation of Congress' Commerce Clause power?66 
The issue presented was whether "the power vested in Congress by Article I, § 8, of the 
Constitution .. .includes the power to prohibit the local cultivation and use of marijuana in 
compliance with California law."267 Stevens wrote the majority, and was joined by Justices, 
Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer. Justices O'Connor, Rehnquist and Thomas dissented. 
Scalia wrote the concurring opinion.268 The majority held that Congress' Commerce Clause 
authority includes the power to prohibit the local cultivation and use of marijuana in compliance 
with California law. 269 In his concurrence, Scalia agreed with the majority's holding, and 
asserted that "Congress may not regulate certainly 'purely local' activity within the States based 
solely on the attenuated effect that such activity may have in the interstate market."270 However, 
he only one page later claims that "marijuana that is grown at home and possessed for personal 
use is never more than an instant from the interstate-market."271 This is precisely the type of 
local activity in California that may have an attenuated effect on the interstate market, and it 
contradicts Scalia's opinion in Lopez.272 More importantly, Scalia's concurrence contradicts his 
adherence to a narrow interpretation of Constitutional provisions and violates his originalist 
approach. His reliance upon a broad reading of "necessary" in the necessary and proper clause 
does not comport with "the definition [of the word] that would have been found in a dictionary 
of that time."273 This is demonstrated by the majority in McCulloch "explicitly reject[ing] the 
266 !d. 
267 !d. at 5. 
268 !d. at 4. 
269 !d. at 1. 
270 !d. at 38. 
271 /d. at 40. 
272 s· ku · 1 9 IS pic, supra note , at . 
273 Collins, supra note 125, at 1064 (citing Ellen P. Aprill, The Law of the Word: Dictionary Shopping in the 
Supreme Court, 30 ARIZ. ST.L.J. 275 (1998)). 
36 
The Life and Jurisprudence of Justice Scalia 
By: Lauren Brophy 
ordinary meaning of the term necessary and instead determined that it should be interpreted to 
include more than the powers that are 'indispensible to the existence of a granted power."274 
Therefore, Scalia's concurrence "allows for an even broader grant of congressional power 
than through the Commerce power alone ... [and] he departs from his jurisprudence by finding a 
broad congressional power to regulate the intrastate growth and sale consumption of marijuana 
for medical use."275 Even when challenged on this issue at a Federalist Society, Scalia cannot 
reconcile his approach in this case with his jurisprudential style of originalism and his earlier 
decision in Lopez. When attendee Leonard Leo asked Scalia how he reconciles his differing 
opinion in Raich, Scalia said, "[ o ]h no. . .get another question." 276 This has led many to 
conclude that Scalia sided with the majority to achieve a conservative goal-namely, opposition 
to the legalization of marijuana?77 Regardless of his true motivation in reaching this decision, 
Scalia certainly departed from his typical jurisprudential approach and adopted a broad reading 
of the Constitution in this case. 
C. Equal Protection and Substantive Due Process Cases 
In the area of equal protection and substantive due process, Scalia also takes an extremely 
narrow interpretation and at times abandons his jurisprudential approach. Scalia emphasizes in 
his Equal Protection jurisprudence that the Equal Protection Clause "should be read as it was 
understood when enacted following the Civil War."278 He also believes that when enacted, the 
Equal Protection Clause did not apply to women, because otherwise the "Nineteenth Amendment 
would have been superfluous."279 Scalia contends that to apply the Equal Protection Clause to 
274 ld 
275 ld at 1067. 
276 Biskupic, supra note 1, at 9. 
277 !d. 
278 Collins, supra note 125, at 1052. 
279 ld at 1053-54 (citing SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW at 47). 
37 
The Life and Jurisprudence of Justice Scalia 
By: Lauren Brophy 
classes other than race would be to advance a "Living Constitution," which he clearly does not 
support.280 He further argues that Equal Protection only protects individuals from "a denial of 
equal protection of the laws and does not guarantee specific rights."281 However, he cannot 
conclude what constitutes a violation of equal protection. Instead, he claims that a violation of 
equal protection "remains subject to interpretation[,]" which contradicts his view that the 
Constitution should be interpreted as it was meant when the amendment was adopted. 282 A true 
originalist "would provide the answer by determining the original meaning of the words when 
they were adopted without subjective interpretation."283 Scalia further believes that substantive 
due process is a concept invented by the Court in order to create new liberties under a "Living 
Constitution."284 These beliefs impacted Scalia's concurring opinion in Adarand Constructors, in 
which he looks outside the meaning of the Constitution to determine what is a permissible 
understanding of due process and equal protection. 
Scalia's concurring opinion in Adarand Constructors v. Pena 285 demonstrates his 
departure from originalism, perhaps to yield a conservative result. Pena is a case in which 
Adarand Constructors challenged a United States Department of Transportation program that 
favored firms that awarded subcontracts to businesses owned by minorities. 286 Adarand was a 
white-owned Colorado Springs firm that lost a bid for a guardrail project, despite the fact that it 
submitted the lowest bid. 287 Instead, a Hispanic company with a higher bid won under the 
Department of Transportation's "disadvantaged business enterprises" program that "presumed 
280 ld at 1054. 
281 !d. 
282 Id 
283 !d. (citing Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 123 (1989)). 
284 !d. at 1054 
285 515 U.S. 200 (1995). 
286 Biskupic, supra note 1, at 177. 
287 ld 
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minorities were socially and economically disadvantaged."288 The majority first und~rtakes an 
analysis of the differences and similarities between the Fifth Amendment and Fourteenth 
Amendment equal protection standards, and ultimately concludes that, "any person, of whatever 
race, has the right to demand that any governmental actor subject to the Constitution justify any 
racial classification subjecting that person to unequal treatment under the strictest scrutiny."289 
In articulating that strict scrutiny is the appropriate standard to apply to this racially-based 
policy, the Court remanded the case to apply strict scrutiny.290 
Scalia's concurrence, although only a paragraph in length, fervently emphasized that 
nothing could justify affirmative action and this favorable treatment of minorities at the expense 
of others. Scalia said that, "in my view, government can never have a 'compelling interest' in 
discriminating on the basis of race in order to 'make up' for past racial discrimination in the 
opposite direction. "291 He then writes his now famous line that, "under our Constitution there 
can be no such thing as either a creditor or a debtor race. That concept is alien to the 
Constitution[ ]. .. "292 This viewpoint is justified by Scalia's jurisprudential belief that Equal 
Protection only protects "denial of equal protection of the laws" and not the guarantee of specific 
rights. However, because Scalia cannot articulate what constitutes equal protection of the law, 
he inserts his own subjective interpretation-in this case, that even "[t]o pursue the concept of 
racial entitlement. . .is to reinforce and preserve for future mischief the way of thinking that 
produced race slavery, race privilege, and race hatred. In the eyes of government, we are just 
one race here. It is American. "293 Given that Scalia does not expound upon his constitutional 
288 /d. 
289 Adarand Construction, supra note 283, at 224. 
290 !d. at 238-39. 
291 !d. at 239. 
292 !d. 
293 !d. 
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basis in reaching the decision, it seems that Scalia is inserting his own interpretation of the Equal 
Protection and Due Process Clauses under the Fourteenth and Fifth Amendments. Accordingly, 
this decision demonstrates Scalia's willingness to depart from originalism and insert his personal 
beliefs. 
D. The Eighth Amendment and Atkins v. Virginia 
Scalia claims that the originalist approach demands that the Court interpret the Eighth 
Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual punishment as what it meant when adopted by the 
Framers. 294 However, this approach is undercut by Scalia's additional undertaking of 
determining what are society's "evolving standards of decency."295 This standard requires courts 
to determine the "new values of a dynamic electorate" and it seems to "contradict Scalia's theory 
of interpretation."296 Scalia's adoption of this "evolving standard is in direct opposition to his 
originalist philosophy of constitutional interpretation." 297 Scalia's dissent in Atkins v. 
Virginia, 298 demonstrates his abandonment of originalism and utilization of the "national 
consensus" of cruel and unusual punishment. 299 
Atkins v. Virginia held that the execution of mentally handicapped criminals constitutes 
cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth Amendment. 300 Justice Stevens wrote for 
the majority, and was joined by Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer. 
Justice Rehnquist filed a concurring opinion, while Justice Scalia's dissent was joined by Justice 
Thomas only. Scalia noted in his dissent that under the Eighth Amendment, "a punishment is 
'cruel and unusual' if it falls within one of two categories: 'these modes or acts of punishment 
294 Collins, supra note 125, at 1057. 
295 !d. 
296 !d. at 1058. 
297 !d. 
298 536 U.S. 304 (2002). 
299 Collins, supra note 125, at 1059. 
300 Atkins, supra note 296, at 304. 
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that had been considered cruel and unusual at the time that the Bill of Rights was 
adopted'"301and "modes of punishment that are consistent with modem 'standards of decency,' 
as evinced by objective indicia, the most important of which is legislation enacted by the 
country's legislatures. "302 This approach of examining a contemporary national consensus is 
antithetical to an original understanding jurisprudence. Importantly, nowhere in the Constitution 
does it say that the Eighth Amendment must be examined through a lens of a national 
consensus. 303 Accordingly, it appears that Scalia is abandoning his originalist approach in 
examining the Eighth Amendment in order to achieve a conservative result that allows for the 
death penalty in more circumstances. 
E. U.S. v. Virginia: History, Not Text, is Dispositive 
Scalia's dissent in US. v. Virginia304 demonstrates that he is willing to over-emphasize 
the importance of history when the text does not explicitly allow for a conservative result. 
Virginia Military Institution (VMI) was the only single-sex, all-male public institution, with a 
mission to train men in leadership in military service and civilian life?05 The federal government 
challenged VMI' s admission policy of only allowing men to attend, claiming that the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment precludes Virginia from exclusively admitting 
men to the unique educational opportunities at VMI.306 After a six-day trial, involving expert 
testimony that determined that women would enhance the training program at VMI, the District 
Court ruled in VMI's favor and rejected the Equal Protection challenge?07 The Court of Appeals 
for the Fourth Circuit disagreed, and held that Virginia cannot justify this admission policy in 
301 !d. at 339 (quoting Fordv. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399,405 (1986)). 
302 !d. at 339-40 (quoting Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 330-31 (1989)). 
303 Collins, supra note 125, at 1059. 
304 518 U.S. 515 (1996). 
305 I d. at 515. 
306 I d. at 519. 
307 !d. at 523. 
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light of Equal Protection guarantees. 308 After VMI created a parallel program for women, the 
District Court determined that the remedial plan met the requirements of Equal Protection. 309 A 
divided panel for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the District Court's approval of the remedial 
plan. 310 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine the issue of whether excluding 
women from VMI denies women equal protection of the law under the Fourteenth Amendment, 
and held that categorical denial of women from the educational opportunities at VMI constitutes 
a denial equal protection to women. 311 
Justice Scalia was the lone dissenter in the case, with Justice Ginsburg writing for the 
majority, and joined by Justices Stevens, O'Connor, Kennedy, Souter, and Breyer. Justice 
Rehnquist filed a concurring opinion, while Justice Thomas did not partake in the decision? 12 
While the majority focused on history, it did so in a way that emphasized that, "our Nation has 
had a long and unfortunate history of sex discrimination. "313 Ginsburg wrote that, "Through a 
century plus three decades more of that history, women did not count among voters composing 
"We the people"; not until 1920 did women gain a constitutional right to the franchise."314 The 
majority also emphasized that the remedial program for women is not comparable to the 
education a woman could receive at VMI. 315 The majority applied intermediate scrutiny in 
analyzing VMI's admissions policy.316 In holding that VMI's admission policy violates Equal 
Protection, Justice Ginsburg concludes that "There is no reason to believe that the admission of 
308 !d. at 524-25. 
309 !d. at 526-27. 
310 !d. at 527. 
3 ll !d. at 516. 
312 !d. at 518. 
313 !d. at 531. 
314 !d. 
315 !d. at 551. 
316 !d. 
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women capable of all the activities required of VMI cadets would destroy the Institute rather 
than enhance its capacity to serve the 'more perfect Union."'317 
Scalia, conversely, focused on a different aspect of history: he scolds the Court for 
"shut[ting] down an institution that has served the people of the Commonwealth of Virginia with 
pride and distinction for other a century and a half."318 He alleged that the majority applied a 
heightened level of scrutiny rather than intermediate scrutiny, and therefore struck down VMI' s 
admission practice impermissibly.319 Scalia further notes that "the function of this Court is to 
preserve our society's values regarding. . .equal protection, not to revise them; to prevent 
backsliding from the degree of restriction the Constitution imposed upon democratic 
government, not to prescribe, on our own authority, progressively higher degrees."320 However, 
past tradition and practice alone does not have an authoritative claim, requiring absolute and 
uncritical adherence. 321 This is especially true if past practices were "pernicious or otherwise 
inconsistent with what a tolerable order requires."322 Additionally, what constitutes a violation of 
Equal Protection, in Justice Scalia' s eyes, is subject to interpretation. 323 Scalia's dissent, 
therefore, exemplifies a willingness to tweak his jurisprudential style in order to achieve 
conservative and traditional results. 
It should not be overlooked, however, that Scalia does adhere, at least in semantics, to his 
typical jurisprudence. Scalia notes that "change is forced upon Virginia, and reversion to single-
sex education is prohibited nationwide, not by democratic processes but by order of this 
317 /d. at 557. 
318 /d. at 566. 
319 /d. 
320 /d. at 568. 
321 J. Richard Broughton, The Jurisprudence of Tradition and Justice Scalia's Unwritten Constitution, 103 W.VA. L. 
REV. 19, 75 (2000). 
322 /d. 
323 Collins, supra note 125, at 1054. 
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Court. "324 He also states that "when a practice is not expressly prohibited by the text of the Bill 
of Rights bears the endorsement of a long tradition of open, widespread, and unchallenged use 
that dates back to the beginning of the Republic, we have no proper basis for striking it down. "325 
However, in reality, Scalia does not focus on the original meaning or text of the Equal Protection 
Clause and instead rests his justifications for upholding VMI' s admission policy on history 
alone. This demonstrates a departure from true originalism and advances a theory of upholding 
laws and practices based solely on their historical importance. This approach reflects an 
ambiguous and even incomplete vision of social change guided only by tradition, rather than the 
text or meaning of the Constitution. 326 
VI. Looking to the Future: The First Amendment and the Affordable Care Act-A 
Potential Pickle for Scalia 
In examining Scalia's family background, his jurisprudential approach, and many of his 
decisions as an Associate Justice on the Supreme Court, it is evident that his deeply and 
sincerely-held religious beliefs have influenced both his personal and professional life. Scalia's 
First Amendment jurisprudence can best be described as giving the narrowest possible reading to 
both the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses and reluctant to making exceptions to minority 
religions?27 This approach, however, may place Scalia in a predicament-both religiously and 
jurisprudentially-since the Supreme Court took certiorari on a current split among the Federal 
Circuit courts.328 Currently, a number of Circuits are split on the issue of whether for-profit, 
secular corporations must comply with the Affordable Care Act's ("ACA") birth control 
mandate, which requires coverage of a variety of types of female contraception, without cost-
324 US. v. Virginia, supra note 304, at 570. 
325 Jd. at 568 (quoting Rutan v. Republican Party oflll., 497 U.S. 62, 95 (Scalia, J., dissenting)). 
326 Broughton, supra note 321, at 77. 
327 See supra note 181 . 
328 Adam Liptak, Justices to Hear Contraception Cases Challenging Health Law, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 25, 2013), 
http://www .nytimes.com/20 13/11/27 /us/justices-take-companies-cases-challenging-contraception-rule.html. 
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sharing with the patient. 329 While certain religious employers are exempt from this coverage, the 
government will not allow commercial corporations to opt-out of coverage on religious 
grounds. 330 
Given Justice Scalia's opinion in Smith,331 it seems that the birth control mandate under 
the ACA is another example of a neutral, generally applicable law, and it need not accommodate 
religious exemptions, much like the Oregon law prohibiting the use of peyote. However, 
because Scalia is a devout Catholic who believes that ones professional and religious identities 
are a single entity,332 it will be interesting to see how Justice Scalia votes on this issue that will 
likely hit close to home. Moreover, Scalia will have to fight against his jurisprudence of 
deferring to legislatures and avoiding judicial activism if he finds the birth control mandate 
unconstitutional. Scalia's decision on this may demonstrate which trumps-his jurisprudence or 
his religious beliefs. 
VII. Conclusion 
It is clear that Justice Scalia's background has greatly influenced his jurisprudence. His 
focus on the text is derived from his father's reverence to the written word in teaching romance 
languages at Brooklyn College, 333 while his tendency to prefer easy-to-apply and rigid rules is 
the result of his military high school. Even Scalia's personality on the bench is reflective of his 
father's intensity and his mother's more jovial and restless nature.334 Scalia, like most, is truly 
the product of his environment. 
329 /d. 
330 /d. 
331 See supra note 250. 
332 See supra note 45. 
333 Biskupic, supra note 1, at 210. 
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In examining his jurisprudence, it is clear that Scalia is faithful to his jurisprudence more 
than he is not. However, when departing from originalism, he follows "Scalia-ism," which 
yields a conservative result and usually has a fiery tone. His colleague Justice Ginsburg has 
noted that "Scalia-ism" "sometimes does go overboard .. .It would be better if he dropped things 
like 'This opinion is not to be taking seriously.' He might have been more influential here if he 
did that. "335 Love him or hate him, Scalia has profoundly impacted the Supreme Court and when 
"newspaper columnists [are] looking for scraps of color" to write about, they invariably tum to 
Justice Antonin Scalia.336 
335 Biskupic, supra note 1, at 354. 
336 ld. at 359. 
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